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Right-wing Extremism and No-go-areas in Germany
LUKÁŠ NOVOTNÝ
Jan Amos Komenský University, Prague
Abstract: Right-wing extremist groups in almost every Western European 
country became aware of the concept of no-go-areas over the course of the 
1980s and 1990s, and some of them even applied this concept over a short 
period. This study looks at the manifestations of this concept in Germany, 
where politics and society are still confronted with the legacy of Nazism. The 
author sets out to examine whether no-go-areas actually exist in Germany, 
and if they do, to look at how life in them is organised, how they are accepted 
by majority society, and how these activities are supported (or initiated) by the 
NPD, a German right-wing extremist party. In the region of former East Ger-
many in particular there has been an increase in support for neo-Nazism as an 
extreme reaction to the deteriorating economic and social situation. Studies 
have shown that in this region more and more citizens are sinking into the 
‘modernisation trap’, and as a result right-wing extremism and neo-Nazism 
are gaining more and more ground. One way in which the extreme right-wing 
NPD and related or subordinate ‘friendly’ organisations want to ‘control the 
streets’, and thereby also the public, is through the establishment of ‘no-go-
areas’, which are areas dominated by neo-Nazis. The objective is to create a 
zone for neo-Nazi sympathisers, chase out foreigners and co-citizens who do 
not share extremist views, and work towards achieving the ultimate goal: de-
stroying democracy and establishing the ‘Fourth Reich’. 
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Introduction
In May 2007, the interior minister of Saxony, Albrecht Buttolo, banned the extreme 
right-wing group ‘Sturm 34’. The reason for his decision was the fact that mem-
bers of Sturm were promoting the ideas of Nazism and were trying to establish 
so-called ‘national liberated zones’(National befreite Zonen) in the Saxon town of 
Mittweida, and moreover doing so by unconstitutional means (Die Welt, 26 April 
2007) [Verfassungsschutzbericht 2006: 65]. In the view of right-wing extremists, na-
tional liberated zones (no-go-areas) are areas in which the only ﬁ gures of rule or 
the enforcement of order are right-wing extremists (usually neo-Nazis). They are 
zones to which foreigners have limited (or no) access. This was one of the objec-
* Direct all correspondence to: Lukáš Novotný, Department of Human Resources Devel-
opment and the European Union, Jan Amos Komenský University in Prague, Roháčova 63, 
Prague, 130 00, Czech Republic, e-mail: novotny.lukas@ujak.cz.
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tives behind Sturm’s objective to establish a ‘national liberated zone’ in Mittwe-
ida. In addition, some leaders in this organisation committed racially motivated 
violent crimes. At the time it was banned, the hard core of ‘Sturm 34’ was made 
up of twenty-ﬁ ve people [Walter 1994; Findeisen and Karsten 1999].
A no-go-area originates when representatives of extreme right-wing groups 
in a given location pressure the relevant national, metropolitan, and public au-
thorities to relinquish ‘supreme authority’ over particular areas, such as play-
grounds, discos, or entire sections of a town, the objective being to make these 
areas ‘national liberated zones’ or, in other words, oases for neo-Nazis.1 The ex-
tremists have a clear idea of what should be done with such areas: they should be 
made into areas where there are no foreigners (ausländerfrei), no Jews (judenfrei), 
and no democracy [Scherr 2007].
In this article, I will examine these no-go-areas, which are a very interest-
ing but as yet unexplored aspect of political and social developments in German 
society. They were the subject of debate during the 2006 Football World Cup, 
when the African Council in Germany decided to draw up a special list of ven-
ues that visitors from African states should avoid. In fact, one-ﬁ fth of all racially 
motivated crimes committed by right-wing extremists in Germany in 2006 were 
committed against Africans or people of African descent.2 Places that the African 
Council recommended that Africans avoid included, for instance, the Berlin train 
station in Schöneweide, the neighbourhood of Köpenick, and the Hellersdorf-
Marzehn and Lichtenberg areas of Berlin. In 2006, references to no-go-areas have 
even appeared in two English guidebooks: The Rough Guide to Berlin and Time out 
Berlin (Berliner Morgenpost, 3 May 2006).
Below I will begin by deﬁ ning the nature and speciﬁ c features of political 
extremism in Germany and then proceed to present the historical context behind 
the origins of these zones and examples of their existence in other countries. In 
order just to describe what the zones are, it was necessary to study the right-
wing extremist press, in particular Deutsche Stimme, the magazine of the Nation-
al Democratic German Party (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands; the 
NPD), Vorderste Front, the magazine of the Young National Democrats (Junge Na-
tionaldemokraten), and other relevant sources. That discussion is followed by an 
analysis of the relationship of the strongest right-wing extremist political party 
the NPD, which evolved out of the post-war course of development of right-wing 
extremism in western Europe [von Beyme 1988], to these zones and to those who 
seek to establish them. In the closing part of the article I will outline the possible 
future of these zones and right-wing extremism in Germany. 
1 By neo-Nazism, I am referring, like C. Mudde, to an ideology that freely promotes the 
return of Hitler’s Third Reich and/or which cites national socialism as their ideological 
origin [Mudde 2000: 230].
2 http://www.afrikanet.info/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=829&Item
id=2.
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Conceptualising no-go-areas in the context of research on extremism
Right-wing extremism
There are many deﬁ nitions of political extremism. Jan Chmelík describes it con-
cisely as the ‘deviation from generally established and currently accepted stand-
ards. It takes the form of a political plan with strong components of opinion in-
tolerance and the rejection of compromise solutions. It is manifested as a radical 
or even militant rejection of the politics of the state and the constitutional order, 
even by violent means’ [Chmelík 2001: 7 an.]. Some authors, mainly those from 
Germany, insist on including anti-system attitudes or opposition to democracy as 
essential deﬁ nitional criteria [Backes and Jesse 1989; Ignazi 2003; Wagner 1994]. 
According to this logic, which is shared by Germany’s Federal Ofﬁ ce for the Pro-
tection of the Constitution, democratic parties are parties that work to maintain 
the present democratic system or would like to establish such a system. Extrem-
ist parties are ones that according to general conceptions deviate from generally 
accepted and actually adopted democratic norms and strive to create or rein-
force authoritarian or totalitarian dictatorship. Extremists consider themselves 
the only power that can ‘rightly’ take control and assert the interests of society 
[Hafeneger 1995: 42].
Right-wing extremism thus involves political entities that are trying to estab-
lish a racially, ethnically, and culturally uniform community. Typical attributes of 
right-wing extremism are that they are authoritarian, hierarchical, systemic, tra-
ditional, nationalistic, and play on the notion of duty [Stöss 2000: 25]. Right-wing 
extremists are a priori intolerant. They regard themselves as the conveyors of 
truth. They divide their neighbourhood into friends and enemies (Freund-Feind-
Denken), and their main enemy is the current political system – democracy and 
its representatives – which they consider decadent and corrupt, and all national, 
religious or other minorities, foreigners, and other groups [Bobbio 2003: 59]. In 
this way, right-wing extremists reject political equality and equality of protection 
under the law and nominate themselves as the ones who will create a political 
system that would establish human inequality and accord basic human rights 
and liberty in society unevenly among different groups of people according to 
ethnicity, race, and religion. Members of extremist groups regard each other as 
friends (Kameraden), while everyone else in their eyes are ‘parasites’ or ‘leeches’ 
(Zecken) [Helsing and Mahler 2001: 10; Verfassungsschutzbericht 2006: 65].
The German political scientists Uwe Backes and Eckhard Jesse [1989] dis-
tinguish four different types of right-wing extremism: ﬁ rst, extremism that uses 
violence and does not possesses a strong system; second, extremism that uses 
violence but embodies a strong system; third, extremism that does not use vio-
lence and is not organised; and fourth, extremism that does not use violence, but 
is very well organised. All these groups are represented in Germany. The most 
visible extremist groups nowadays are political parties, which have been experi-
encing a ‘renaissance’ in recent years, especially in Eastern Europe. The NPD is 
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the most successful party so far and holds seats in the municipal legislature in 
Saxony, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern [Gertoberens 2004; Novotný 2008a]. About 
two thousand members of the NPD are estimated as having a primarily neo-Nazi 
orientation (out of a total of seven thousand NPD members; the party newspaper 
Deutsche Stimme has a print run of 21 000) [Novotný 2008b: 18].
Extremism and modernity
Although the NPD is without question the best-known and most successful right-
wing extremist party, other forms of right-wing parties, non-party right-wing 
extremism, and right-wing movements and sub-cultures have also been making 
major progress. In 1992 the German political scientist Hans-Gerd Jaschke ques-
tioned whether perhaps right-wing extremism was turning into a new form of so-
cial movement [Jaschke 1994], and he noted that, particularly with respect to the 
new priorities of right-wing extremists, speciﬁ cally, their ethnicisation of social 
and political issues, a new sub-culture is emerging that is capable of appealing to 
protest voters. This opinion evoked a wave of critical but also concurring respons-
es [Rucht 2002; Hellmann and Koopmans 1998]. Today it is clear that Jaschke 
assessed the situation correctly. German extremists – especially the NPD – see 
their biggest objective as ‘marching in the midst of the common people’ (Marsch 
in die Mitte des Volkes) [Verfassungsschutzbericht 2006: 75]. According to various 
polls and surveys conducted in Germany, up to 15% of Germans sympathise with 
right-wing extremist views [Grumke 2007]. This modern extremism is the result 
of reactions of disadvantaged groups to ‘the other modernity’ [Minkenberg and 
Perrineau 2007]. For Ulrich Beck, characteristic of today is the widespread sense 
of a loss of security and safety [Beck 2004]. This is one of the reasons why more 
recent publications on right-wing extremism in Germany have emphasised social 
issues and the fact that extremism (both right- and left-wing) emerges in society 
when people’s living standards and outlook in life deteriorate [Bergmann and 
Erb 1994; Klärner and Kohlstruck 2006].
Ronald Inglehart [1997] sees the decisive moment in the change of be-
havioural standards as the transition to ‘post-material values’. This is what the 
German political scientists Erwin Scheuch and Hans-Dieter Kligemann were 
speaking about in the 1960s when they were assessing the causes of right-wing 
extremist party beneﬁ ts, in particular those of the Republicans and the NPD. For 
Scheuch and Klingemann, this marked a change in voting behaviour towards the 
‘normal pathology of western industrial society’ [Scheuch and Klingemann 1967: 
12]. A concomitant effect was the attempt to ethnicise social issues by arguing 
that foreigners are at the root of the socio-economic problems Germany faces to-
day. Right-wing extremists then try to put themselves in the role of the ‘avengers’, 
those who are trying to homogenise German ethnic and social sub-cultures. 
The number of neo-Nazis, one of the most radical and anti-democratic 
groups in the spectrum of right-wing extremism, has been increasing in Germa-
Lukáš Novotný: Right-wing Extremism and No-go-areas in Germany
595
ny. According to the most recent news reports on constitutional order protection, 
the years 2006 and 2007 saw an increase in membership of about two hundred 
more people [Verfassungsschutzbericht 2007].
If we analyse the proﬁ le of current members of right-wing extremist groups, 
they are mostly socially deprived people. This suggests that voters of the NPD 
are mainly seeking an improvement in their social situation, and in this respect 
they favour the displacement of foreigners and minorities and even limiting their 
rights and freedoms. A number of studies from German public opinion institutes 
(for example, a study by Forsa conducted in August 2007 on a sample of the Ger-
man population) showed that about 2% of the German population support the 
NPD (and another right-wing extreme party DVU) and 4% of the German public 
can imagine that one day they could vote for a right-wing extremist party, while 
another 7% would vote for them under certain circumstances (Der Spiegel, 23 Au-
gust 2007). Among the unemployed support for right-wing extremist parties is 
twice as high as in the general public. In addition, according to the above-men-
tioned study by Forsa, up to one-quarter of the unemployed are able to imag-
ine that they could vote for such a party. In terms of the support for right-wing 
extremist parties, a negligible (and statistically immeasurable) minority of the 
right-wing extremist intelligentsia is oriented towards nationalism and chauvin-
ism (völkisch ideologies). Among roughly one-half of these older sympathisers 
and voters, there is evident interest in a return to ‘old times’, that is, going back 
to National Socialism.
The younger generation is different. Young right-wing extremists are try-
ing to ﬁ nd another ‘way of life’. They are familiar with one old rule: the years 
between the ages of 12 and 16 are of crucial signiﬁ cance for shaping their political 
opinions. The presidium of the German extremist NPD, headed by Udo Voigt, 
wrote about this in one of the party’s most recent documents. That is why we are 
now witnessing a massive offensive from the NPD to target this age group.3 To-
day there are about one thousand extremist web sites in German [Novotný 2008b: 
18]. They provide visitors with information about the actions of different move-
ments and about where to buy music CDs by neo-Nazis groups, t-shirts, jackets, 
and brand (Thor Steinar) items bearing neo-Nazis symbols, such as Celtic crosses, 
black suns, or the number 28, which symbolises the letters B and H, signifying 
the group Blood and Honour, that since 2000 has been banned in Germany [Vir-
chow 2004]. 
Current results from different studies conducted among students in Germa-
ny reveal some unpleasant ﬁ ndings: for example, research among high-school stu-
dents between the ages of 13 and 19 conducted in 2003 in Hagen in the Rheinland 
(on a sample of 676 students) indicated that 46% of them agree with the opinion 
that foreigners living in Germany should adapt more to the lifestyle of Germans. 
3 According to research by ARD/Infratest, 17% of all voters between the ages of 18 and 24 
voted for the NPD in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Among men in this age group the NPD 
even gained as much support as the SPD [Verfassungsschutzbericht 2006: 92].
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One-third of those interviewed believed that foreigners are a priori more inclined 
towards criminality than Germans, 30% said they feel like foreigners in their own 
country, 20% would not allow any foreigners into Germany, and 11% think that 
Jews in Germany should have fewer rights than Germans. Claus Homm, the au-
thor of the study, concluded that roughly 11.5% of these pupils are xenophobic and 
have a tendency to support neo-Nazism. Boys and young men show more sympa-
thy for these views than girls and women. Homm suggests immediately strength-
ening education in democracy and in tolerance before right-wing extremists gain 
greater inﬂ uence on shaping the political opinions of these young people. 
No-go-areas
The notion of ‘national liberated zones’ (no-go-areas) has appeared in the dis-
course of right-wing extremist groups in Germany since the 1990s [Wagner 1998]. 
These zones were ﬁ rst mentioned in Germany in articles published in magazines, 
like Einheit und Kampf (no. 2, September 1990) and Vorderste Front (1991); [Jaschke 
and Rätsch 2001: 119], and in the magazines of the National-Democratic Univer-
sity Union (Nationaldemokratischer Hochschulbund) and the Young National Demo-
crats (Junge Nationaldemokraten), a student organisation of the NPD. According 
to a main article in Einheit und Kampf, titled ‘Make National Liberated Zones’ 
(Schafft national befreite Zonen), it is the objective of right-wing extremists to take 
control of different parts of towns, such as discos, bars, public squares, and other 
(for them) important public places. Attempts to take control of these places have 
so far always been accompanied by violence against those parts of the public that 
extremists view as a problem. Reading these and other extremist texts about no-
go-zones (they will be mentioned below) evokes an association with the period of 
National Socialism, when Nazis battled to establish ‘Jew-free’ zones (‘judenfreie’ 
or ‘judenreine Gaue’). There is no doubt that creating such a situation is the objec-
tive of the ‘zone’ initiators today.
Einheit und Kampf, mentioned above, pointed out the economic and territo-
rial independence of these zones. Economic independence from the state is im-
portant to extremists because such independence would enable them to break 
free from what they call ﬁ nancial capitalism. It would allow extremists ﬁ nancial 
freedom and opportunities to obtain ﬁ nancing from their activities (for example 
selling CDs, brand clothes, posters, ﬂ ags, etc.). Neo-Nazis want to be the sole sub-
culture to exercise authority in these ‘zones’, assume a self-governing function, 
and pursue political and cultural activities in these zones [Geyer 2002: 98].
They have been particularly successful in the newest federal state – the 
former territory of the GDR. In this region young people in particular are losing 
‘the self-conﬁ dence of current existence’ owing to the unmet promises of mod-
ernisation and the poor socio-cultural conditions that offer no perspectives to 
young people [Bauman 2003: 156]. These young people often fall into the ‘social 
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trap’ or ‘modernisation trap’, as deﬁ ned by Klaus Wahl in the late 1980s [Wahl 
1989; Milza 2005], where by escaping into extremist sub-cultures these young 
people are seeking safety and security. Richard Sennet describes the situation 
by noting that there is a defensive element to the longing to belong to a commu-
nity, wherein the community of ‘us’ can be employed anywhere and anytime in 
defence against chaos and oppression [Sennett 1998: 138]. These kinds of socially 
excluded can limit their social competences, especially in relation to co-existence 
with groups that are easy to blame as the cause of the deterioration in their social 
situation, groups like minorities and foreigners. This outlook can then progress 
quickly to an aggressively xenophobic stage. A good illustration of this is the for-
mation of no-go-areas and the desire to be the only source of ‘law and order’ in 
such zones. By establishing these zones, those behind them achieve a substitute 
form of what others – socialised in democratic values and society – achieve in 
their everyday lives, that is, social recognition, assuming that social and welfare 
recognition is a normative condition of all communicative behaviour. 
The intention behind the creation of no-go-areas is to create a counter-
weight to existing state institutions that otherwise control a given area. By estab-
lishing these zones right-wing extremists also aim to establish contact with the 
rest of the population, providing people with assistance and offering economic 
and social alternatives (Einheit und Kampf 1990: 52). In those areas that neo-Nazis 
designate as no-go-areas they mark the public spaces with various, typical Nazi-
group symbols, such as ‘88’ or ‘NBZ’ – the abbreviation for the ‘national libera-
tion zone’. Such areas tend to be urban neighbourhoods or residential areas that 
have socio-economic problems and high crime rates (for example, Magdenburg-
Olvenstedt and Guben).4 
It is hard to determine how many of these zones exist. The Ofﬁ ce for the 
Protection of the Constitutional Order in the federal state of Brandenburg reg-
isters 17, but does not consider them (as I have said) to be ‘national liberation 
zones’, the way the right-wing extremists do, but thinks of to them as ‘fear zones’ 
(Frankfurter Rundschau, 26 February 1997). The Federal Ofﬁ ce for the Protection 
of the Constitution and many research studies [Döring 2008] are implying that 
these zones do not yet exist in Germany and remain an (as yet) unfulﬁ lled objec-
tive of various right-wing extremist subjects, mainly the NPD. The 17 zones cited 
in the 2007 annual report of Brandenberg’s Ofﬁ ce for the Protection of the Con-
stitutional Order are zones where extremists have managed to cut out all other 
groups from participating in social life, or more precisely, they have excluded 
4 Statistics on criminal offences provide information about which neighbourhoods are be-
ing affected. For example, in Magdeburg most crimes were committed in Olvenstedt and 
Wolmirstedt, in Schwerin in Hagen, in Halle in Südstadt, and in Merseburg. Olvenstedt 
is a very rundown neighbourhood. In 1993 it experience a population increase of just one 
inhabitant, followed by a steep decrease in inhabitants in subsequent years. Between years 
1990 and 2000 there was a decrease of 39%. The biggest decreases in the number of inhabit-
ants occurred between 1996 and 2000 [Döring 2008: 197].
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other (non-neo-Nazi) groups from participating in or attending any cultural or 
other activities, such as youth clubs, rock clubs, pubs, etc.). In doing so, they have 
been able to establish something like a ‘third position’ between capitalism and 
communism. Torald Staud speaks of the gradual Fascisation of some places and 
remarks: ‘National liberation zones don’t exist here, but there are such places 
where there are very few governable democratic parties’ [Staud 2006: 10; Niet-
hammer 1969]. These places are becoming real ‘fear zones’ and, considering the 
behaviour of some groups, are to be avoided. 
No-go-areas in Germany
The German notion of ‘no-go-areas’ is inﬂ uenced by the Western European ex-
perience of right-wing extremism (mostly neo-Nazi) groups, where there have 
been discussions about establishing these ‘zones’ since the 1980s [Glyn 1992]. 
However, the earliest remarks in the German periodicals Einheit und Kampf and 
Vorderste Front support, with the backing of the British neo-Nazi movement, the 
‘International Third Position’. One model of this was developed by right-wing 
extremists in the Italian group Terza Posizione (TP), which managed to establish 
some degree of economic and political infrastructure in the form of several shops, 
cultural centres, and self-schooling for children of working Italians (mainly farm-
ers). In this way the TP offered the working classes an alternative to ‘normal life’ 
and halted the progress of the Communist Italian Party (KPI) [Döring 2008: 56]. 
Alongside the Terza Posizione that emerged in the mid-1980s, there was the Span-
ish group Bases Autonómas (BA), which attempted to create a system of no-go-
areas, the Portuguese Movimento de Accao National (MAN) (Einheit und Kampf 
1/1990: 34); [European Monitoring Centre 1999: 34], and the French Nouvelle 
Résistance [Bale 2002: 36]. The German right-wing extremist press evaluated the 
actions of these groups in glowing terms as exemplary progress. 
After German right-wing extremists discovered the concept of no-go-areas 
at the start of the 1990s, their operations and programme aims showed no evi-
dence of their having developed this model further in some way. A change came 
in the mid-1990s with the emergence of the internet network ‘Thule’, a kind of 
vox populi of right-wing extremists on the internet, uniting like-minded groups 
throughout Germany [Dietzsch and Maegerle 1996: 924]. Thule-Journal explains 
the objective of the network’s initiators: ‘With the help of networking mailboxes 
we want to create a free zone’ (Thule-Journal 1/1993: 3). Activity on Thule grew 
rapidly after it was set up, and there were even discussions on the network of no-
go-areas. In March 1997 the sites died out, apparently owing to internal disagree-
ment among their founders [Dietzsch and Maegerle 1997: 178; Verfassungsschutz-
bericht 1998: 79]. After Thule’s extinction, discussion about no-go-areas vanished 
from Germany for several years. It resurfaced at the end of the 1990s, mainly in 
neo-Nazi organisations in Saxony, such as Nationaler Jugendblock Zittau or Junges 
Nationales Spektrum [Verfassungsschutzbericht Sachsen 2003: 13].
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The concept of no-go-areas, according to right-wing extremists, is based on 
several criteria. First, a no-go-area should lead to the creation of ‘national cen-
tres’ (Deutsche Stimme 11/1999: 18). However, how this is achieved is not entirely 
clear from the articles in the right-wing press. One of the ways envisioned is by 
right-wingers buying up land and real estate in speciﬁ c parts of a neighbour-
hood, where everybody who embraces German nationalism can conduct their 
lives freely. This approach is of course unrealistic given the low socio-economic 
status of right-wing extremists today. However, Steffen Hupka, the author of an 
article published in Deutsche Stimme, considers this a realistic aim and believes 
that it ‘is possible to collect the necessary money with the help of friends who are 
employed’ (author’s translation; Deutsche Stimme 11/1999: 18). He also imagines 
that in such a zone right-wing extremists would then be able to create their own 
infrastructure, separate from the state, and in their zone they could collect rent, 
provide loans, manage the buildings, organise concerts, own stores, etc. Accord-
ing to him, these centres would become ‘national fronts’ [Röpke 2004].
Second, in order to establish such a system of national centres it is neces-
sary to increase the membership level of right-wing extremist associations and 
political parties. Increased activity at the federal level should help to achieve this. 
Members of friendly groups and other associations are, for example, encouraged 
to take part in various existing organisations. It is regarded as a success if by this 
means someone manages to gain as many new backers as possible and is able 
to take over the group’s decision-making and thus essentially ‘dislodge’ their 
entire operation (Deutsche Stimme 1/2000: 18). In it in these ‘grey zones’, for ex-
ample, in organisations of exiles, student groups, or other revisionist, friendly 
’associations’, Neo-Nazis see an opportunity to assert and create a ‘bridge to civil 
society’ (Deutsche Stimme 5/2000: 16). The main objective is to get close to the 
ordinary people and take up as their own the themes that are most important to 
those people; for example, themes like the ﬁ ght against environmental pollution 
or for animal protection, against abortion, unemployment, etc. (Deutsche Stimme 
1/2000: 18). In addition, neo-Nazis also retain their ‘traditional’ themes, where 
they have already secured some achievements, primarily in the above-mentioned 
‘grey zones’. One such theme is a revisionist view of the Second World War or 
the conviction that ‘Germany is bigger then the Federal Republic’, whereby they 
are referring to the lost, formerly German eastern regions that were inhabited by 
German minorities [Staud 2006: 17].
Third, to establish no-go-areas right-wing extremists bet on eliminating 
‘deep-seated defence reﬂ exes’ (Deutsche Stimme 2/2002: 17; 4/2002: 7), by which 
they mean ‘liberating’ Germans from the Nazi past, ‘from the psychological pres-
sure of the spirit of the time’ (Deutsche Stimme 3/2000: 22), and thus to rid them of 
their constant self-consciousness of ritually apologising for their history. In their 
view, this is all a part of political correctness, which in the right-wing extremist 
press is referred to as ‘Unsinn’ or nonsense (Deutsche Stimme 2/2002: 3). The NPD 
and its ‘struggle for minds’ is ascribed a big role in achieving this aim. 
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Fourth, by establishing no-go-areas it is necessary to strengthen the ‘organ-
ised will’ of the youth and offer them sufﬁ cient options for self-fulﬁ lment while 
at the same time endeavouring to unify the opinions of and discipline the youth 
(Deutsche Stimme 2/1999: 11; 10/1999: 17; 12/1999: 14). This is succeeding well 
particularly in the east of Germany, where even many years after the fall of com-
munism the establishment of a communal, embedded, civil society failed (for 
example, churches and unions in this part of the country have few members than 
in the western part of Germany) and right-wing extremists here have begun to 
win support, especially among disillusioned youth.
Right-wing extremists and control over locations
Uta Döring distinguishes between public, semi-public, and private places where 
right-wing extremists attempt to establish NGAs [Döring 2008: 141]. They use 
different strategies of presenting themselves and expanding activities to obtain 
control over these places. Right-wing extremists still face the biggest difﬁ culties 
in trying to exercise control over public spaces. Yet, squares, pedestrian zones, 
bus stops, playing ﬁ elds, and swimming-pools are important spaces for extrem-
ists, because they can make themselves very visible in these places and can best 
demonstrate their group behaviour and draw the attention of a larger part of the 
population. The presence of extremists in these free spaces tends to make use of 
the space difﬁ cult for citizens. Parts of the German population, such as citizens 
with darker skin or members of the anarchist sub-culture, stay out of these spaces 
because they are worried about the possibility of violence. A similar view prevails 
among the majority of the population, who do not like the aggressive behaviour 
of these local ‘rulers’ either. Compared to other types of places, mentioned below, 
these are the fewest in number, but they are also the sites of the largest numbers 
of extremist crimes [Döring 2008: 188]. An example of one such area is the district 
of Prenzlauer Berg in Berline, certain parts of which foreigners and some local 
Germans are really afraid to visit (Die Zeit, 8 November 2007). 
Döring classiﬁ es restaurants, pubs, discos, and clubs as semi-public areas, 
which, although they are more common, are not fully controlled by extremists 
because they usually do not have sufﬁ cient economic means to own these places. 
Most common are private places, the ‘home territory’ of right-wing extremism. 
These include the free spaces that right-wing extremists do dominate, most often 
shops, pubs, gardens, or clubs, owned by extremists or followers of this move-
ment. An example is a pub in the village Heilsberg near Saalfeld in Thurungia. In 
April 1997 it was leased by couple of ‘friends’ and they quickly turned it into the 
hub of the local neo-Nazi scene. Other than neo-Nazis, no one else tried to go to 
this pub. Nor did anyone protest its existence, not even the provost or the town 
pastor. In the view of many inhabitants the reason was that the neo-Nazis did not 
misbehave or disturb public life in any way. Initially even the Thurungian Ofﬁ ce 
for the Protection of the Constitutional Order. After half a year, ofﬁ cials ordered 
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an inspection of the site and uncovered there the largest arsenal of weapons on 
a single site in Thurungia and they shut the pub down. Similar institutions can 
be found throughout Germany, and generally they are more common in the new 
federal states.
Types of no-go-areas and support for them inside the NPD
Although it is not the rule, we can certainly see that the NPD has inﬂ uenced the 
formation of ‘national liberated zones’. Generally, wherever the NPD is political-
ly strong, the willingness to create fear zones is markedly higher than anywhere 
else. The politics of the NPD widely support such activities and the party often 
ﬁ gures as the co-initiators of their establishment. The NPD has achieved the most 
success in Mecklenburg-Front Pomerania and Saxony. In some villages in these 
federal counties, the NPD is the third strongest political power. Their biggest suc-
cess was winning 38.6% in the last communal elections in the village of Postlow. 
Although it may not seem so from the results of the elections to the German Bun-
destag, the NPD is nonetheless gaining in strength. In the last federal elections in 
2005 they had a vote share of 1.6%. Experts agree that if the NPD had cooperated 
more intensely in this period with neo-Nazi institutions their results would have 
been even higher (but not enough to enter the Bundestag) [Staud 2006: 15]. Even 
if they did get into Parliament, it is clear that they would be isolated there in their 
opinions. But in society they are deﬁ nitely not in isolation – at least in the eastern 
part of the country. The NPD is well aware that they are more successful in eco-
nomically disadvantaged regions. For this reason, during their last convention in 
Bamberg in the summer of 2008, they changed the strategy they use to address 
voters, and instead of aiming to be a party of all-round success, that is, a party 
that can celebrate political gains across the country, they plan to concentrate more 
on their most successful regions, such as those in the former East Germany, and 
there they hope to become a ‘catch-all’ party. One of the ways in which they plan 
to strengthen their position is by establishing ‘no-go-areas’, where they intend to 
demonstrate how they would govern in power. 
Let’s now look at how four theorists in the NPD party in the 1990s (when 
the discussions about zones were culminating) viewed the eventual establishment 
of these zones. I examined articles that these four party ofﬁ cials published in the 
right-wing extremist press. Each of these four theorists has their backers and op-
ponents. The ﬁ rst example is Tomas Hetzer, a representative of the National Dem-
ocratic Academic Unit. Hetzer addressed the unit with the words: ‘with the zones 
we will create a counter-balance. We have to create the kind of free spaces in which 
we can de facto assume power and we will be able to penalise – that is, to punish 
– weaklings and enemies, support co-ﬁ ghters, and help oppressed, excluded, and 
persecuted fellow citizens’ (Vorderste Front 2/1991). Hetzer is interested in creating 
a system in which the state and its ‘knaves’ will occupy a secondary role in shap-
ing people’s lives. The purpose of this zone is to take control of people’s fates and 
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establish a separate legal order and system of values. These zones need not be just 
geographic; they can also be mental zones or spaces in which the neo-Nazi world-
view dominates. According to Hetzer, in these zones the NPD will be able to dem-
onstrate ‘freely’ and without having to ask permission from the state authorities, 
and the NPD’s ‘friends’ (i.e. neo-Nazis) will be responsible for maintaining safety 
on the streets and will protest and agitate against asylum-seekers. The reason 
Hetzer gives for creating such zones is that they should be places of support for 
‘co-ﬁ ghters, where people will measure us by our acts’. He sees the main reason 
for their creation as a means of securing ﬁ nancial independence, which will help 
shape the party’s ‘inner system and coordination between friends’. 
Jürgen Distler is the second NPD representative who in Deutsche Stimme 
has broached the possibility of establishing ‘national liberation zones’. He puts 
more emphasis than the others on the political dimension. According to Distler, 
even now, ‘in the centre of Germany’, there exists a ‘strong sub-culture of neo-
Nazi youth’ (Deutsche Stimme 12/1999). In Distler’s view, which is most certainly 
exaggerated, this movement is already an important socialising factor among the 
young generation, and in his opinion it is necessary to support it and win it over 
politically on the side of the NPD. While Distler exaggerates, it is true that there 
really are parts of East Germany where neo-Nazi sub-culture to at least some 
extent does fulﬁ l a socialisation role. But it is by no means a mass phenomenon. 
According to Distler these nationalistically motivated youth are waging a battle 
on the cultural front, a battle that has arisen out of their rejection of liberal-capi-
talist society. Distler here refers to Antonio Gramsci and his concept of ﬁ ghting 
for cultural hegemony. According to Distler, the only way to promote the objec-
tives of the NPD is for the party to politically agitate and recruit young people on 
its side. In another words, it is necessary to replace the cultural with the political. 
These disillusioned youth have to be shown that the NPD represents the route to 
changing circumstances and systems. It is a fact that citizens of the former East 
Germany and the young generation in general have declining faith in democ-
racy, something Distler demonstrates in an article in Deutsche Stimme. Drawing 
on surveys, for example, he argues that while in the year 1990, 41% of Germans 
considered democracy in Germany as the best form of government, in the year 
1997 the ﬁ gure was only 23%. So Distler recommended supporting by peaceful 
means movements of the disillusioned and socially excluded by creating zones in 
which they can move around and fulﬁ l themselves freely.
Jürgen Schwab is the author of the third view in the discussion of ‘national 
liberated zones’ (Deutsche Stimme 10/1999). Schwab advocates the need to create 
zones in which the initiators will have an ‘interpretative monopoly’, will them-
selves decide what is right and what is wrong, and will shape public opinion. 
Schwab’s position is strongly anti-democratic, but it is nonetheless the most ‘tol-
erant’ of the four views presented here. Schwab writes that everyone who behaves 
‘fairly’ (that means also foreigners and people with alternative views) deserves 
protection in the zone. In his view it is necessary to use the territory of the former 
East Germany, where there is evidently strong support for the NPD, to establish 
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these zones. About the western parts of the country he notes: ‘In the west of the 
country the concept of free zones is by comparison [with the eastern part of the 
country – author’s note] more complicated. Here, the main concern should be to 
ﬁ ght by all possible means allowed by law in order to build a solidary movement 
of cultural resistance.’ 
Steffen Hupka, another top member of the NPD, writes in his article in 
Deutsche Stimme what surely most neo-Nazis in Germany wish: ‘A liberated zone 
should not be just the material base of our ﬁ ght, it should also provide us with 
spiritual and moral sources of strength. It has to be the base of our domestic 
struggle. Thence we can move farther along the front, we must create more, sec-
ondary battle zones, so we have to open these liberated zones.’ (Deutsche Stimme 
11/1999) The point of establishing ‘liberated zones’ is to establish a ‘national and 
social system of government’, which means removing the democratic state sys-
tem and establishing neo-Nazism.
Inside the NPD, sympathies for the above concepts vary between different 
factions. Hetzer and Hupka maintain the most radical positions. On the other 
hand, Distler emphasises the cultural dimension and argues the need to intro-
duce a political dimension into the ﬁ ght for cultural hegemony. What unites all 
four views is their volkisch posturing and the demand to establish neo-Nazi prin-
ciples in these zones. ‘National liberated zones’ are nothing more than a synonym 
for the establishment of a dictatorship, and what this is about – regardless of 
whether individual authors state or write this directly or indirectly – is the transi-
tion to neo-Nazism based on racial ‘purity’. That all the top NPD members agree 
with these visions – even if just any one of them – and aspire for their realisation 
puts them in sharp conﬂ ict with the German constitutional order. 
German citizens living in the areas of the former East Germany need to be 
assured that the democracy established after 1989 is not just a Western import; 
that the democratic progress of their country is also in their interest [Siegler 1991]. 
Nowadays, in the eastern parts of Germany, especially in Saxony and Mecklen-
burg-Frontal Pomerania, there are big waves of protests and disillusionment with 
democracy (e.g. demonstrations against the Hartz IV reforms, etc.). The NPD 
could beneﬁ t much from this situation. More than ever before it can offer the pub-
lic not just nationalistic and chauvinist invective but instead is able to understand 
the people’s social problems and offer a solution: eliminating people’s problems 
through the formation of an ethnically homogeneous society. Their campaign 
prospers because democracy does not yet have sufﬁ ciently deep roots in the new 
federal states.
Four NPD aims in relation to no-go-areas
First, I must say that the concept described below is the NPD’s party strategy 
and is recommended by all its ofﬁ cials. It is not a process through which to cre-
ate ‘national liberation zones’; it is a strategy to obtain political power. Because, 
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according to neo-Nazis, the zones represent one step on the way towards taking 
control of all of society, we should look at these principles. Shortly after Udo 
Voigt became the chair of the NPD, at a party convention in Stavenhagen in 1997 
the party formulated its ﬁ rst three strategic principles: the struggle for parlia-
ment, the struggle for the streets, and the struggle for people’s ‘minds’. In the 
year 2004 the struggle for organised will was also added.
When the NPD participate in elections, they refer to this as the ‘struggle for 
parliament’. The municipal congresses in which the NPD is represented (Saxony, 
Mecklenburg – Vorpommern; the NPD refers to this as the Dresden-Schwerin 
axis) serve mainly as public propaganda fora for their ideas. They are also impor-
tant strategic places because as representation in the legislature gives this party 
an air of trustworthiness and secures ﬁ nancial resources for it [Verfassungsschutz-
bericht 2006: 90]. It is possible to glean from NPD documents that the party is not 
at all interested in constructive politics. The motivation, in addition to money, for 
their participation in elections is to try to prevent – or at least complicate – the 
eventual prosecution of the party’s representatives. 
The NPD considers demonstrations and other public scenes as part of the 
‘struggle for the streets’. This reference is borrowed from the Nazi era, when Hit-
ler and his followers were also concerned about ‘capturing the streets’, that is, 
about obtaining control over public areas, which they succeeded in doing during 
the 1930s with the help of Sturmabteilung (Storm detachment or stormtrooper) 
units. The NPD added to this concept the idea of creating ‘national liberation 
zones’ using their own ‘warriors’ to maintain ‘order’. For the party, demonstra-
tions and protest actions are not only a way of promoting themselves, but also of 
reinforcing the sense of belonging among its members [Mikulčíková 2007]. Above 
all, the NPD has a clear aim: appealing to younger voters. Currently, the average 
age of party members is (as in the far left groups) the very inauspicious age of 65 
[Milza 2005: 354] Through the ‘struggle for the streets’ offensive they want to try 
to bring into their ranks young people associated in ‘familiar alliances’.
The NPD means two things by the ‘struggle for people’s minds’: the need to 
engage in educational activities, and the need for the party to operate and expand 
its aims and ideas to the wider ranks of society. To this end the party offers oc-
casional training sessions and prepares its activists to be able to critically counter 
their opponents’ ideas. The party’s entire intellectual guidance comes from the 
party’s centre [Verfassungsschutzbericht 2006: 91]. The party chair, Udo Voigt, is a 
political scientist and he and the narrow circles of top party leadership together 
follow developments in society and try to react appropriately so as to gain fur-
ther points among the public. Under his leadership, the party’s media face has 
changed dramatically, its pre-election campaigns have modernised, and a greater 
accent has been put on communal politics. In his view, today the NPD does not 
have to be just a ‘cadre’ party, but should instead open up and present itself to 
society as a modern party. 
The last concept is the ‘struggle for organised will’. By this the NPD and 
especially its chair hope to provide an answer to what has so far been the biggest 
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weak point of German right-wing extremism: the fractionalism of powers. The 
aim is to establish cooperation, create an institutional framework, and form a true 
‘national front’ (Heimatfront). The ﬁ rst step in this was the signing of an agree-
ment between the NPD and the German Common Union (DVU, Deutsche Volks-
union) on mutual support between their candidates (the so-called Deutschland-
pakt) [Verfassungsschutzbericht 2006: 66, 89]. This was de facto a non-aggression 
pact, wherein both sides divided up the territory of Germany according to the 
areas in which each is strongest and there they do not run against each other.
Conclusion
This article is concerned with a phenomenon that, according to the arguments of 
state ofﬁ cials, the police, and other relevant institutions, does not actually exist 
– no-go-areas. By contrast, the national press in Germany, various civic associa-
tions, and also experts [Milza 2005: 356] acknowledge and give examples of the 
existence of no-go-areas. No-go-areas in the sense in which they are understood 
and deﬁ ned by neo-Nazis do not (yet) exist or exist exceptionally in some neo-Na-
zi pubs or private clubs. These are places to which people who do not share the 
views of the group that controls them do not have access anyway, so in the strict 
sense of the word they are not no-go-areas. To this day, neo-Nazis have largely not 
succeeded in realising their goals in full and their plans for now remain mainly 
just ideas. What do exist – and press articles and statements from respondents 
conﬁ rm this [Staud 2006: 13; Frindte and Neumann 2002] – are fear zones, places 
where foreigners, members of a national minority, or even just people that do not 
think like neo-Nazis, are scared to go.
What else could be the outcome of the formation of these zones? German 
democratic political parties need to understand and accept East German identity 
more than they have in the past. Thus far most parties have tried to diminish the 
speciﬁ c features of the region of the former GDR and dissolve them in a republic-
wide outlook. The result of this has been a weakening of the trust placed in these 
political subjects and an increase in the number of supporters and voters of radi-
cal and extremist parties, in particular of Die Linke and the NPD. Both parties are 
very capable of taking advantage of the authoritarian views that exist in a large 
part of the former GDR region as a result of forty years of communist rule there. 
‘All for the good of the people’ (Alles für das Wohl des Volkes) was once the main 
slogan of the SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands), and is today present-
ed to the public by Die Linke and the NPD in reinvented forms. This is very ap-
parent in Saxon-Switzerland not far from the Czech border. Around 17% of the 
inhabitants in the new federal states (i.e. former East Germany) earn 7.5 Euro an 
hour or less (in the old federal states, i.e. former West Germany, only 8% earn 
that little) (Die Welt, 22 August 2008). Currently (August 2008) unemployment in 
the eastern part of Germany is around 12.8%, while in the western part it is 6.4%. 
These are revealing socio-economic data for regional speciﬁ cs. 
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The strong support for the NPD and the idea of forming ‘national libera-
tion zones’ is the East German public’s reaction to the (alleged) failure of politics. 
According to recent research, faith in democracy has been declining across all of 
Germany, so today even two-thirds of the inhabitants of the western states (60%) 
do not have faith in democracy, but the biggest decline has been observed in the 
eastern part of the country (Die Welt, 21 April 2008), where only 44% have trust 
in democracy. The population’s frustrations connected with the transformation 
and from joining the western part of Germany are still very strong. The situation 
is even worse in the former GDR in terms of its trust in the economic system, 
only one in three former East Germans believes in the system and considers it the 
right thing (the average for Germany as a whole is 48%). In addition, fewer East 
Germans believe in the existing social system – just 30% compared to the overall 
German average of 40%. Germany’s chief objective should be to halt these trends. 
Torald Staud found that if we do not measure right-wing extremism according 
to the number of votes and mandates in elections but instead according to idea 
preferences, then in the eastern part of Germany support for NPD groups is as 
much as 30% [Staud 2006].
Neo-Nazi no-go-areas will probably not be established any time soon in 
Germany. The majority of the German public and the country’s politics are demo-
cratically oriented (conﬂ ict democracy – streitbare Demokratie). For all that, it is 
disturbing how well the neo-Nazis are able to take advantage of the democratic 
deﬁ cit that can be found in every society, and in the post-modern society this is 
doubly true. Regrettably, today they are already able to rely on certain bastions of 
support - the economically and socially deprived regions in the western part of 
Germany, and this makes the situation much more complicated.
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